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ABSTRACT: This paper presents and defends an argument that the continuum hypothesis is 
false, based on considerations about objective chance and an old theorem due to Banach 
and  Kuratowski.  More  specifically,  I  argue  that  the  probabilistic  inductive  methods 
standardly used in science presuppose that  every proposition about the outcome of  a 
chancy  process  has  a  certain  chance  between  0  and  1.  I  also  argue  in  favour  of  the 
standard view that chances are countably additive. Since it is possible to randomly pick 
out a point on a continuum, for instance using a roulette wheel or by flipping a countable 
infinity of fair coins, it follows, given the axioms of ZFC, that there are many different 
cardinalities between countable infinity and the cardinality of the continuum.
Quine told us that there are no islands in science, and that even our mathematical beliefs have to face 
the tribunal of experience. The examples usually adduced in support of his view are non-Euclidean 
geometry and quantum probability, mathematical theories whose development was in part inspired 
by physical discoveries. But in those cases, it is unclear whether our beliefs about the mathematics 
itself were revised, or just our beliefs about the applicability of certain mathematical theories. In this 
paper I give a clearer demonstration of the way the empirical can impinge on the mathematical. I 
argue that  our scientific knowledge of  chancy processes  provides compelling abductive reason to 
think  that  uncountable  collections  of  points  on  a  continuum  come  in  a  wide  variety  of  sizes, 
contradicting Cantor’s famous hypothesis that all of them have the same size. I will not establish any 
novel mathematical results here: my argument is based on a classic theorem, due originally to Banach 
and Kuratowski (1929), which is well-known to set theorists but less well known to philosophers.
There is room for an argument of this kind because, mathematically speaking, the question of the 
continuum hypothesis is in a very strong sense unresolved. Gödel (1938) and Cohen (1963) proved 
that the hypothesis is independent of the ZFC axioms (Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with Choice). This 
showed that any argument to settle the issue would have to appeal to assumptions that go beyond 
those canonised in standard set theory. But it remained opaque what outside source those principles 
might spring from. For a while some hoped, with Gödel, that internal, mathematical considerations 
would settle the matter in the form of a large cardinal axiom. But nowadays there is reason to be 
pessimistic on that front: all large cardinal axioms that have been tried leave the undecidable status of 
the continuum hypothesis unaffected, and there are generally applicable strategies for extending that 
conclusion to any further large cardinal axioms (Levy and Solovay 1967, Honzik 2017). More recently, 
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Hugh Woodin has explored mathematically motivated argument strategies for refuting the continuum 
hypothesis (Woodin 2001) and for establishing it (Woodin 2010). But even by his own lights, these 
strategies have hitherto delivered inconclusive results (Rittberg 2015, Woodin 2019). In 1986, Chris 
Freiling pointed to a very different avenue, by suggesting that we can settle the question by appeal to 
considerations about the incidence of  certain random events.  Here I  provide an argument in that 
tradition, which lacks the problematic features of Freiling’s specific proposal.
Certain random processes have a continuum of possible outcomes. For instance, if you spin a roulette 
wheel, the “0” slot could end up in a continuum of different positions once the wheel has come to a 
standstill. A random dart may land in one of a continuum of different positions on the dartboard. And 
if you have an endless row of coins and flip all of them, the outcome is one of a continuum of possible 
sequences of heads and tails. Quantum mechanical examples of such processes include a momentum 
measurement on a particle with known position, or a countable infinity of x-spin measurements of 
particles in z-spin eigenstates. I will argue that the chance distributions of such procedures have a set 
of formal features that, jointly, tell us something about the size of their outcome space –– and thus 
about the size of the continuum.
Diagram 1: Any whirl of a spinner determines a plane angle α = ∠PCPʹ between the pointer’s  
initial position P, the centre of rotation C, and the pointer’s final position Pʹ 
For perspicuity, I will focus primarily on the example of a spinner: a rotating device with an off-centre 
pointer,  which on a given spin lands some random angle away from its starting point.  A roulette 
wheel is an example, or a spinning top, or one of those fidget spinners you can buy at a gas station. 
Suppose we have a concrete object like this in front of us, mark a pointer, and give it a whirl. The 
outcomes of the procedure are the angles at which the pointer could land. The set " = [0°, 360°) of all 
those outcomes is the outcome space. Events are represented by subsets of ": for instance, the interval 
(10°, 15°) represents the event that the pointer lands at an angle between 10° and 15°. Standardly, 
events are taken to be propositions about where the spinner lands on a particular occasion (e.g. Lewis 
1980). One can also think of them more abstractly as “ways the spinner might land”. For our purposes 






The chance of an event is a real number between 0 and 1 that indicates the objective likelihood that the 
event takes place. For instance, if our spinner has an uneven mass distribution, the chance of the event 
[0°, 180°) might be 0.53, meaning that the spinner is objectively more likely than not to land on that 
side.  My argument will  rely on a  realist  view of  chances,  according to which they supervene on 
objective, physical features of the setup; for reasons discussed in Sections I and II, I take this realism 
about chance to be justified by the need to explain the overwhelming success of probabilistic methods 
of prediction in science. In particular, this view entails that chances are not “assigned” or “defined” by 
us any more than the mass and temperature distribution of the spinner are, and that they are not in 
any straightforward sense a measure of our actual expectations. The chance distribution is simply the 
function from events to real numbers that relates events to their chances. 
Below I shall argue that we have good reason to think the chance distribution Ch of a random spinner 
has the following four properties:
A. Perfect Precision. It is certain that exactly one of the outcomes occurs: Ch(") = 1.
B. Improbable Outcomes. No individual outcome has a positive chance of being realised: Ch({x}) = 0 
for any outcome x ∈ ".
C. Totality. Every event E ⊆ " has a chance Ch(E).
D. Countable Additivity. If E0, E1, … ⊆ " are disjoint, then Ch(E0 ∪ E1 ∪ …)  =  Ch(E0) + Ch(E1) + …
By far the most contentious of these claims is the totality premise (C), which I will defend in detail in 
Section II. Section I will cover (A) and (B), and Section III argues for premise (D).
Mathematically, the joint upshot of (A-D) is that a continuum-sized set " admits of a total, countably 
additive measure Ch: 𝒫(") → [0, 1] with the property that Ch({x}) = 0 for every x ∈ ". Now in 1930, 
Ulam showed, within ZFC, that this is not true of the first uncountable cardinal ℵ1: that is, ℵ1-sized 
sets do not admit a measure of this kind (Jech 2002, lemma 10.13, p. 132). So if (A-D) are true, it follows 
that the continuum 2ℵ0 is distinct from the first uncountable cardinal ℵ1, which is just to say that the 
continuum hypothesis 2ℵ0 = ℵ1 is false. In fact, it turns out to follow that 2ℵ0 is far greater than ℵ1, 
exceeding not only the second uncountable cardinal ℵ2, but also ℵ3, ℵ4 … ℵω, ℵω1, … ℵωω, ℵωωω, … and 
the least weakly inaccessible cardinal.
Let me start  with a few preliminaries about the argument.  Firstly,  I  do not  assume the spinner is 
symmetric or fair: the premises are consistent with a heavily skewed chance distribution. Secondly, as 
is standard, I take it that events can be physically possible and still have chance 0. After all, a whirl of 
a spinner has uncountably infinitely many possible outcomes; if they all had a positive chance of being 
realised,  the  sum would exceed 1.  Some theorists  find this  counterintuitive,  and have developed 
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treatments  of  probability  that  allow  for  infinitesimal  chances:  non-zero  chances  smaller  than  any 
positive number. The chance of an event is then not a real number but rather a non-standard real or 
hyperreal number (Benci et al. 2013, Hofweber and Schindler 2016; for objections see Williamson 2007, 
Easwaran 2014). This makes no difference for the present argument: even if chances are hyperreals, 
they still have a real part –– the unique real number closest to their hyperreal value. And thus, as I will 
argue, a real-valued measure Ch satisfying (A-D) would still have to exist –– it is just that Ch(E) would 
represent the real part of the chance of E rather than the chance itself.
Thirdly, let me say a bit more about the totality premise (C), which basically says that any proposition 
about the outcome of the spin has a particular chance, possibly 0, of coming true. While this is a very 
intuitive assumption, it is liable to be controversial in the case of infinite-outcome procedures. The 
default mathematical treatment of chance in such cases straightforwardly incorporates premises (A), 
(B) and (D). But it does not bear out premise (C) in the same way: when writing down a probability 
distribution on a continuum-sized outcome space, the custom is to single out a class of “measurable” 
events first, and to assign chances only to those events. In Section II,  I argue that this is done for 
expediency, and that there is no good reason to think there is a real distinction in the world between 
chance-bearing  and  chance-free  events  corresponding  to  the  mathematical  distinction  between 
measurable and non-measurable sets of points. Furthermore, I argue that there is strong abductive 
reason to think (C) is true, because the assumption of totality is implicit in our ordinary scientific 
reasoning about chance.
Fourthly, while I presented this as an argument about a random spinner, its premises (A‑D) are stated 
schematically,  and "  can stand in for other continuum-sized outcome spaces.  For instance,  (A‑D) 
remain plausible if one interprets " as the outcome space of a random dart, or an infinite sequence of 
coin  flips,  or  one  of  the  quantum-mechanical  processes  mentioned.  These  latter  substitutions  are 
particularly relevant if you think that the chances of quantum-mechanics are the only genuine chances 
in nature: to establish the falsehood of the continuum hypothesis, only one version of the argument 
needs to hold up. You can also substitute a merely possible process.  Suppose,  say,  that a spinner 
satisfying conditions (A‑D) is metaphysically possible. Then it is at least possible for a chance measure 
of the appropriate kind to exist. But the existence of such a purely mathematical function is not a 
contingent matter. So the measure actually exists, whence the continuum hypothesis is actually false. 
In  order  to  evade that  version of  the  argument,  it  is  not  enough to  deny that  actual,  real-world 
spinners  fail  to  meet  one  of  the  conditions  (A‑D).  One  has  to  deny  that  such  spinners  are  even 
possible.  Likewise,  infinite  arrays  of  flipping coins,  random darts,  and their  quantum-mechanical 
analogues would somehow have to be impossible.
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Formally, the argument motivates the addition of the following axiom to ZFC:
Chance Measurability of the Continuum: Continuum-sized sets " admit of a total, countably 
additive measure Ch such that Ch({x}) = 0 for every x ∈ ". (M)
Solovay (1971) showed that the theory ZFC + M is consistent.  Banach and Kuratowski (1929) first 2
proved that the negation of the continuum hypothesis,  2ℵ0  > ℵ1,  is  a theorem of ZFC + M. In an 
appendix I provide an intuitive rendition of their proof. Ulam (1930) and Solovay (1971) strengthened 
this result, showing that given ZFC + M, there must be a cardinal κ ≤ 2ℵ0 such that κ is (i) weakly 
inaccessible, (ii) real-valued measurable  and (iii) weakly Mahlo. These are large cardinal properties in 3
the sense that unlike ZFC + M, ZFC alone cannot prove that any of them are instantiated. But κ is not a 
large cardinal in the sense of implying the consistency of ZFC.
Since the proposed axiom M is consistent with the axiom of choice, the present argument cannot be 
reframed as  an  argument  against  the  axiom of  choice.  This  makes  it  importantly  different  from 4
Freiling’s  chance-based  argument  against  the  continuum  hypothesis.  While  Freiling’s  symmetry 
axiom Aℵ0 is also compatible with choice, his reasoning in support of that axiom extends to justify 
stronger axioms conflicting with choice, and arguably even axioms that conflict with ZF –– Freiling 
pointed this out himself. This is generally taken to be the main reason why this argument won so few 
converts: to accept Freiling’s premises one must enter a slippery slope towards denying some highly 
plausible,  fruitful  and  widely  accepted  mathematical  principles  (see  Maddy  1988,  §II.3.10).  By 
contrast, the argument of this paper is tailor made for M, and cannot without further assumptions be 
used to argue against ZFC. Another contrast with Freiling is that the present argument has a stronger 
conclusion, purporting to show that the continuum is greater than various large cardinals.
 To be precise, Solovay showed ZFC + M is equiconsistent with ZFC + “There exists a two-valued measurable 2
cardinal”. Most set theorists would agree the latter theory is consistent, so that ZFC + M must be consistent, too.
 A real-valued measurable cardinal κ admits of a total probability measure that is not only countably additive, but 3
also κ‑additive, meaning that if λ < κ, then any union of λ sets of measure zero has measure zero itself. While 
ZFC + M proves the existence of such a cardinal κ, it does not state that 2ℵ0 itself is one –– it may be that the 
continuum has a countably additive measure but no 2ℵ0-additive measure. M also does not entail the existence of 
a measurable or two-valued measurable cardinal, which is a cardinal κ that admits of a κ-additive, total probability 
measure that assigns measure 0 or 1 to every subset of κ. Only real-valued measurable cardinals greater than 2ℵ0 
are guaranteed to be two-valued measurable as well. See Solovay 1971; Jech 2002, Ch. 10.
 Except, of course, if you are willing to use the continuum hypothesis (CH) as a premise against the axiom of 4
choice (AC): after all, any argument can be refashioned as a modus tollens against its premises. In particular, 
ZF + M + CH ⊢ ¬AC, and Solovay 1970 has a consistency proof for ZF + M + CH. But unlike with CH, there are 
strong intuitive and abductive reasons to accept AC. So I think only someone skeptical of AC for independent 
reasons would have any inclination to construe the argument this way.
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I. Improbable Outcomes 
Adopting the terminology of Easwaran 2014, let us say an event is minuscule if it has a chance that is 
less than any positive number. Assuming that chances are real numbers, minuscule events are simply 
zero-chance events. But as discussed, I am happy to leave open the possibility that some minuscule 
events have infinitesimal chances. For the spinner and the other chancy procedures mentioned, every 
outcome (that is, every singleton event) is minuscule, and there are a continuum of those outcomes. 
Thus these procedures are all illustrations of the fact that some outcome spaces can be divided into a 
continuum of minuscule events. This is a property of the continuum that is not trivially shared by 
lesser infinite cardinalities. In particular, because of countable additivity, an outcome space can never 
be divided into ℵ0 minuscule events –– more on that in Section III. This paper is about how we can 
leverage this special fact about the continuum in order to investigate its size.
But first, I should argue that it is indeed a fact, defending premises (A) and (B) above. At the end of 
the section, I will explain why it looks to be a special fact –– in that we have no reason to think lesser 
infinite cardinalities have this property, too. The most perspicuous example for these purposes is the 
infinite row of flipping coins.  Premise (A) is  self-evident in that  case:  if  we flip all  the coins,  the 
outcome is  always some particular  infinite  sequence of  heads and tails.  Premise  (B)  says  that  no 
individual  sequence  has  a  positive  chance.  To  see  this,  take  an  arbitrary  sequence.  Say  it  starts 
HTTHHT… In order to get that sequence, the first coin must land heads, which has chance ½. And the 
first three coins would have to land HTT, which has chance ⅛. And so on: consider n coins to see that 
the chance of getting the whole sequence is at most ½n. So the chance must be less than any positive 
number. If the coins are not quite fair, one can still argue this way, provided the chances for individual 
coin results have an upper bound r < 1: for any n, consider the first n flips to see that the chance of the 
sequence is less than rn. So it cannot be positive.
To get a continuum-sized outcome space by coin flips alone, you will have to perform infinitely many 
flips. Given actual physics, these flips are bound to be spread out over an infinite stretch of space or 
time. As we will see in Section II, special difficulties attach to such procedures. So it is worth our while 
to defend (A) and (B) in the case of the spinner too. A spinner selects between a continuum of possible 
angles in a single whirl, so this procedure only requires a finite amount of space and time.
In the spinner variant of the argument, (A) states that the spinner picks out a particular angle over all 
the others. To show this, we do not need a physically unrealistic idealisation like a completely sharp 
and perfectly rigid pointer. Perfect precision, in the sense required, is a matter of settling on a clever 
and flexible way to determine what angle counts as being “picked out”. Here is one such way. Let C be 
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the centre of gravity of the spinner. Now take any off-centre physical part of the spinner, and call it the 
pointer. Label the pointer’s centre of mass prior to the spin P, and its centre of mass after the spin Pʹ. 
Whatever happens, a whirl of the spinner thus determines a particular plane angle ∠PCPʹ (as seen in 
diagram 1 above). (If the spinner is assumed to be rigid, this angle ∠PCPʹ is moreover independent of 
the  choice  of  pointer,  in  that  any choice  of  an  off-centre  pointer  yields  the  same result.)  We can 
visualise the outcome space " of the possible angles as a continuous circle around C. The intersection 
between the ray CP and " is 0°, and the intersection between CPʹ and " is the random angle picked 
out by the spinner. The continuity of " is essential here: to guarantee that the rays CP and CPʹ both 
intersect " no matter what happens, we need to assume that the circle is Dedekind complete. And in 
order for that to be the case, " has to be a continuum.
It may be objected that, due to the vague boundaries of the spinner and its pointer, the recipe I wrote 
down does not unambiguously designate a particular angle in ". But our inability to determinately 
specify these physical  objects  does not make the objects  themselves indeterminate (Evans 1978).  I 
showed how any pair of a spinner-shaped physical object and a pointer-shaped part of it determines a 
particular angle on any spin. The argument does not require anyone to specify the members of this 
pair, merely that a suitable pair exists. If there are many suitable pairs, all the better! It does not matter 
that they are so similar to one another that it is impossible for us to pick one out determinately.
Premise (B) says that the spinner is diffuse, meaning that no particular angle in " has a positive chance 
of being picked out. There are various ways to show this. One argument starts from the assumption 
that the spinner has no “supermagnetic” angles, so that no individual angle is infinitely more likely 
than any other. Since there are uncountably many angles, they cannot all have a positive chance. But 
then,  by  our  assumption,  no  angle  has  a  positive  chance.  Here  is  a  different  argument.  Take  an 
arbitrary point P from ". Consider an arc AB including the point P. There is some chance x that the 
spinner lands in AB.  Since P  falls  within AB,  the chance of  hitting P  is  at  most x.  If  x is  zero or 
infinitesimal, so is the chance of landing on P. Suppose x is positive. If the spinner can land (almost) 
anywhere in the arc AB, it is plausible that a small enough arc AʹBʹ around P, with extremities Aʹ and 
Bʹ closer to P, has a chance under x/2 of being hit. But then the chance of hitting P is less than x/2. By 
the same token, it is less than x/4, less than x/8, etcetera. So it is less than any positive number.
All  such arguments  for  premise  (B)  can be  resisted by taking the  view that  determinism is  both 
metaphysically necessary and incompatible with the existence of non-trivial chances. On that view, 
there is necessarily only a single angle the spinner could land on, and a single way the coins could 
land. One might also deny the possibility or coherence of non-trivial chances for other reasons. I grant 
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that, given such views, you should not expect to learn anything about the continuum by thinking 
about chance. But anti-realism about chance is not a happy position to occupy. The notion of objective 
chance is  very fruitful  in  science,  where  probabilistic  methods of  prediction have met  with great 
empirical success. This fact offers a powerful reason to think the concept of chance has a reflection in 
reality, or at least in a possible version of it. Moreover, non-trivial chances can arguably arise even in 
the presence of determinism, as in statistical mechanics –– see Loewer 2001 and Glynn 2010.
Are  there  physically  possible,  diffuse  random  processes  with  outcome  spaces  smaller  than  the 
continuum? It  is  not  clear there are.  Certainly,  no procedure based on coin flips can give you an 
outcome space with fewer than 2ℵ0 outcomes, all of which are minuscule. For in order to make the 
outcomes minuscule, you have to perform infinitely many flips (since any finite sequence of heads and 
tails has a positive chance). But the moment you do infinitely many coin flips, the size of the outcome 
space balloons to 2ℵ0. So there is not going to be any way to divide an outcome space into less than 2ℵ0 
minuscule outcomes using coin flips, or dice, or anything like that.
What about spinners? Here the matter is more subtle. You might imagine, after all, that there could be 
an  אl1-spinner:  a  diffuse  spinner  that  is  for  some reason physically  constrained to  land within  an 
ℵ1‑sized set of angles. Even if ℵ1 < 2ℵ0, it seems conceivable that such a spinner could exist. Note that 
this  does  not  put  ℵ1-spinners  and  2ℵ0-spinners  dialectically  on  a  par:  assuming  diffuse  random 
spinners are possible at all, we have conclusive mathematical reason to think a diffuse spinner with a 
continuous outcome space is possible. But there is no guarantee for the possibility of ℵ1-spinners. As a 
matter of mathematical necessity, any spinner must pick out an angle from the continuum [0,  2*), 
since that set is Dedekind complete. But we have no similar, positive reason to support the possibility 
of a diffuse spinner that can only land within an ℵ1-sized subset of [0, 2*).
This paper makes the further point that, moreover, we do have good reason to reject the possibility of 
ℵ1‑spinners, in light of Banach and Kuratowski’s theorem. Thus we are led to accept the possibility of 
2ℵ0-spinners while rejecting the possibility of ℵ1-spinners, forcing the conclusion that 2ℵ0  does not 
equal ℵ1. In the same way, the other results cited above distinguish the continuum from other infinite 
cardinalities like ℵ2. It may be worth noting, however, that my premises are in fact consistent with the 
possibility of minuscule-outcome spinners whose outcome spaces have a size κ below the continuum. 
But such a κ-spinner would only be possible for κ that are much greater than ℵ1. To be precise, κ 
would have to be greater than or equal to the least real-valued measurable cardinal (see footnote 2 
above). It should not surprise us that all these set-theoretical results bear on which κ‑spinners spinners 
are and aren’t possible. After all, metaphysical possibility is constrained by the mathematical facts.
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Besides coin-flip based procedures and κ‑spinners, one could try to think up a different way of picking 
one of  κ  < 2ℵ0  outcomes.  However,  so  far  no-one has  ever  succeeded in  actually  constructing a 5
convincing method. Particularly in the case κ = ℵ0, this is not for lack of trying: John Norton (2018) 
documents dozens of designs for a so-called de Finetti lottery –– a fair random method for picking a 
natural number. But as his discussion shows, none of them ultimately work. Norton also proffers his 
own suggestion, but was forced to concede in Norton and Pruss 2018 that it, too, is fatally flawed. I 
reckon this is no coincidence. For if chances are countably additive (Section III), de Finetti lotteries are 
impossible; and if they are always total (Section II), diffuse procedures with ℵ1 different outcomes are 
impossible too. But there are diffuse procedures with 2ℵ0 outcomes. So 2ℵ0 must be distinct from ℵ1.
II. Totality 
Now we arrive at the controversial part: the Totality premise (C). Depending on the example, this is the 
claim that that every spinner event has a chance, the claim that every infinite coin flip event a chance, 
and so on. Let us say a physical process is totally chancy if it has this feature. It is uncontroversial that 
procedures with finitely many outcomes, like die rolls, are totally chancy. But that assumption is not 
standardly extended to processes with a continuum of outcomes. In §2.2, I go into the reasons for this, 
and explain why I think they are bad reasons. But let me start with the positive case for thinking that 
physical systems, if they are chancy at all, had better be totally chancy.
2.1  The Abductive Case for Totality 
Imagine you are given a lamp, call it the Mystery Lamp, that is operated by a single green button on its 
base. When you press the green button, sometimes the Mystery Lamp blinks at you after a second. 
Sometimes it stays dark. The internal operations of the lamp are governed by a random mechanism 
hidden on the inside: this mechanism is set in motion whenever the button is pressed, and whether or 
not the lamp blinks depends in some way on the final state of that internal mechanism. While the 
nature of this random mechanism is entirely unknown to us (hence the lamp’s name), we do know that 
it  returns  to  its  initial  state  after  each  run,  so  that  the  results  of  successive  presses  are  causally 
independent. We also know that the mechanism is robust and does not change between trials. Without 
having an opportunity to examine the innards, you are asked to investigate how likely the lamp is to 
blink at a given press of the button.
 Here is one design that may have occurred to the reader. Let ℵ0 ≤ κ < 2ℵ0. Now pick a κ‑sized set of angles X 5
from [0, 2*) and spin a random spinner until eventually we hit an angle in X. The chance of ending up on any 
particular angle x ∈ X is minuscule, and there are κ possible outcomes! Norton (§2.3) considers this design for 
the case κ = ℵ0. But as he observes, it has a fatal bug. We are overlooking an important outcome: it is possible 
that  the  procedure  fails  to  terminate,  because  we  only  get  angles  from  [0,   2*)\X  forever.  On  plausible 
assumptions, the chance that this happens equals 1, because [0, 2*)\X outnumbers X to the tune of 2ℵ0 to 1. So 
on reflection, the outcome space of this procedure is not partitioned into κ  minuscule cells after all: it has κ 
minuscule cells, and one huge cell of measure 1.
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Here is how you would ordinarily go about it. You press the button a number of times, recording each 
time whether the lamp blinks or not. Suppose you do a hundred trials and record eighty-one blinks. 
You can conclude with some confidence that the chance of blinking on a given trial is about 80%. That 
hypothesis explains your findings so far,  and it  also justifies certain expectations about the future 
behaviour  of  the  lamp:  we  have  a  sophisticated  understanding  of  random  behaviour  in  chancy 
situations. This is, in the simplest instance, how probabilistic induction works in science. And the core 
motivation  for  espousing  realism about  chance,  I  take  it,  is  that  it  promises  to  explain  why this 
inference method should be so reliable.
Now if the random mechanism inside the mystery lamp is assumed to be totally chancy, we have at 
least a schematic idea of how that explanation goes. Different hypotheses about the chance of blinking 
yield different expectations for the blinking frequency in a string of a hundred trials. By observing the 
actual frequency, we test the full gamut of chance hypotheses, confirming some while disconfirming 
others. And that helps us determine what behaviour to expect in the future.
But if the mechanism in the lamp were not totally chancy, that means we have to contend with an 
important additional hypothesis: for in that case, it may be that the blinking event has no chance at all. 
The problem is that if this is so, we have no idea what to expect. The observation of 81 blinks over a 
hundred  trials  disconfirms  the  hypothesis  that  the  chance  of  blinking  is  70%,  and  very  strongly 
disconfirms the hypothesis  that  the  chance of  blinking is  10%.  Does it  confirm or  disconfirm the 
hypothesis that this event has no particular chance at all? We cannot say, and that is itself highly 
problematic if we are trying to vindicate ordinary inductive inferences. For if the hypothesis that the 
event of blinking has no chance fits the data equally well as the hypothesis that the chance of blinking 
is around 80%, then that substantially undermines the strong justification we thought we had for our 
inductive predictions about the future behaviour of the lamp. 
There are many metaphysical mysteries about the nature of objective chance. Nonetheless, chance is in 
some sense the most well-understood kind of future contingency there is.  When something has a 
chance, we know what to expect. By contrast, if an event lacks a chance altogether, we have no idea 
what  to  expect.  Consequently,  the  existence  of  chance-free  events  wreaks  havoc  on  the  standard 
justification of probabilistic inductive reasoning. This happens even if the event under examination in 
fact has a chance –– the mere epistemic possibility, however slight, that it might lack a chance is what 
gets us into trouble. Our ordinary inductive reasoning about such cases rules out that possibility from 
the outset; in other words, it presupposes that any event has a chance. That strong, simple assumption 
provides  an  elegant  justification  for  ordinary  probabilisitic  inductive  reasoning,  which  would  be 
undermined by the existence of chance gaps (events that lack a chance). 
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This issue about induction is not the only problem with the notion of chance gaps: they raise a range 
of awkward metaphysical and epistemological questions that lack satisfactory answers. Why do some 
events have a chance while others lack it? How are we to know that a particular event has a chance? If 
an event has no chance, what should be our credence that it will happen? Can chance gaps arise only 
in complex, infinite-outcome setups like a spinner? Or could there also be a chance-free coin flips and 
chance-free dice? If not why not? And if so, how do you make a chance-free die?
These basic questions on chance gaps have received little to no attention in the literature, but Hájek 
and Smithson 2012 and Hájek, Hawthorne and Isaacs ms. do make progress on some of them. These 
authors note that, even if an event lacks a precise chance itself, it can still be described by what they 
call an indeterminate chance. Rather than a real number, an indeterminate chance is a closed interval of 
real numbers between 0 and 1. For a given chance-free event E, the lower bound of this interval is its 
inner measure –– the supremum of all the chances of events that entail E and have a precise chance. Its 
upper bound is the outer measure. The view then addresses epistemological issues about chance gaps 
with a generalised version of Lewis’ Principal Principle, making use of the fact that the authors also 
support the idea of imprecise or “mushy” credences. The generalised principle runs as follows: for any 
proposition P,  conditional on admissible evidence entailing that P  has imprecise chance [a,  b], you 
should have an imprecise credence that P equal to [a, b].
This theory of indeterminate chances makes progress on many questions about chance gaps. But it 
only brings out the difficulty about probabilistic inductions with greater urgency. In particular, in spite 
of the generalised Principal Principle, it is still entirely opaque just how our expectations about the 
future should be affected by the existence of indeterminate chances. One issue here is that imprecise 
credences are themselves problematic (White 2009, Elga 2010, Schoenfield 2017). But there is another, 
more pressing difficulty. Recall our investigation of the Mystery Lamp, which found 81 blinks in a 
string of a hundred trials. What are we to make of this finding in a world with indeterminate chances? 
The conclusion that there is a determinate chance of around 80% of blinking is presumably no longer 
warranted.  It  could  just  as  well  be  some  indeterminate  chance.  But  which  one  would  it  be?  A 
[79%, 81%] chance? Or [50%, 90%]? Or [0%, 100%]? How are we even supposed to tell the difference? 
Is any hypothesis more plausible than the others? And, crucially, what difference does it make for our 
expectations about the future?
Hájek and friends offer no clear answer. But let us cut them some slack and assume they eventually 
meet those challenges one way or another. That is, suppose they gave us a way of finding out whether 
and how indeterminate the chance of a given event is, and a way to extract clear predictions from 
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indeterminate chance hypotheses. Inevitably, those predictions would often differ from the predictions 
extracted on the basis of our present, cruder inductive methods, which overlook the possibility of 
indeterminate chances entirely. So the view would motivate a revision of our current probabilistic 
inductive methods. Will the new methodology produce better science than the present one? Only time 
will tell, but I hope I will not be thought too much of a spoilsport for sounding a note of scepticism. 
The basic reason for believing in objective chance is to help justify our actual inductive methods, and 
to explain their  remarkable success.  If  the metaphysics of  chance we end up with recommends a 
sweeping revision of those very methods, we have clearly gone astray.
The simple, naïve view that all events have a determinate chance recommends itself as a scrutable and 
conceptually clean metaphysical  vision that underwrites probabilisitic reasoning in science as it  is 
actually conducted. Moreover, we should be skeptical that a more sophisticated alternative, which 
differentiates chancy and chance-free events, or sharp and indeterminate chances, can accomplish this. 
Standard statistical reasoning is hugely predictive in science, and it builds on the assumption that 
every event has a chance. This gives us excellent abductive reason to think that assumption is true.
2.2  Totality and Symmetry 
Why is this view not widely endorsed? The reasons have to do with mathematical practice: standardly, 
mathematicians will define a measure over a continuum-sized space on a subalgebra of its powerset. 
For instance, the standard uniform measure on the interval [0, 2*) has the class of Lebesgue subsets of 
[0, 2*) as its domain, and assigns no value to non‑Lebesgue sets of points. Why do mathematicians 
ignore non-Lebesgue sets? Is there a theorem showing that spinners have chance gaps? Has it been 
mathematically proven that there is no such thing as the chance of a non‑Lebesgue event? All too 
often, theoretical treatments of chance suggest the answer is “yes”. Van Fraassen 1991 (ch. 3) is a case 
in  point.  His  discussion  is  sophisticated  and  provides  a  detailed  explanation  of  the  relevant 
mathematical result, Vitali 1905. But then, Van Fraassen simply concludes “Therefore the requirement 
to have [chance] measures defined everywhere is unacceptable” (p. 55), as if the theorem in question 
were that total chance functions on the continuum do not exist. But that is not what Vitali showed. 
And while it is true that his result is the reason that mathematicians restrict their chance measures to 
Lebesgue sets, it does not give philosophers any clear reason to do the same.
What Vitali did show is that, given the axiom of choice, countably additive, total chance functions on a 
continuum lack a certain kind of symmetry: more specifically, they fail to be translation invariant, or 
rotation invariant in the case of a circle. Let us say that a spinner is totally fair if it has the following 
property: for every set S of points on the circle, and every rotation ρ, the chance of landing on a point 
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in S is equal to the chance of landing on a point in ρS. Vitali’s theorem shows that totally fair spinners 
are not possible. This is an interesting and surprising result. Sure, no-one would argue that any actual, 
concrete spinning top or fidget spinner was totally fair. Realistically, these things always have some 
small bias or imperfection in some direction or other. So it was clear from the outset that a totally fair 
spinner  is  a  physically  unrealistic  idealisation.  However,  it  is  striking  that  this  ideal  cannot  be 
achieved even in principle.
However, if one restricts the measure Ch to the Lebesgue regions of the circle, then one can at least get 
a function Ch that satisfies the equation Ch(ρL) = Ch(L) wherever Ch is defined. So by ignoring the 
non‑Lebesgue  sets,  we  gain  an  important  symmetry.  In  mathematics,  symmetries  are  crucial  for 
reining in complexity: without them, you can’t prove theorems, and your models become intractable. 
So  mathematicians  ignore  non-Lebesgue  subsets  for  the  same reason they  ignore  most  things:  to 
achieve the symmetry and simplicity they need in order to do mathematics. This practice implies no 
positive judgment that these events lack a chance, merely the practical judgement that those chances 
are best ignored in order to manage the complexity of the situation.
Mathematicians,  then,  have  excellent  reason  to  ignore  non-Lebesgue  spinner  events.  But  we 
philosophers do not, at least not if we are interested in the nature of future contingency. For one, it is 
questionable whether it is even possible draw any sharp general boundary between Lebesgue and 
non-Lebesgue propositions about the future that corresponds to the mathematical distinction between 
Lebesgue and non-Lebesgue sets of real numbers. But let’s not dwell on that difficulty. Even if we can 
draw this distinction, surely we should not ignore the non-Lebesgue spinner events. The least we can 
do is ask whether these events do or do not have a chance.
We have already discussed the drawbacks of the negative answer to this question in §2.1. The main 
problem  is  that  the  possibility  of  chance-free  events,  however  slight,  throws  the  justification  of 
probabilistic  induction into serious jeopardy.  Meanwhile  the positive  answer,  Totality,  is  relatively 
simple, perfectly consistent with ZFC, and yields a solid metaphysical underpinning for probabilistic 
reasoning. The only cost is that Totality forces us to give up the intuition that a perfectly symmetric 
random spinner is possible. Given total chanciness, and our other assumptions, there must be some 
sets of angles E and rotations ρ such that Ch(ρE) > Ch(E). But how much of a cost is this, really? As 
noted above, there is little empirical motivation for the contrary intuition: in the real world, spinners 
never have perfect rotational symmetry.
What is more, related intuitions about rotational symmetry are uncontroversially mistaken. Intuitively, 
rotations on an ideal spinner should preserve not only the chance of events but also their logical 
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strength, in that it should be impossible to rotate a set of points onto a strict sub- or superset of itself. 
This is true for finite sets of points, but the principle does not hold in general: most rotations do in fact 
map some events onto strictly entailed ones. For instance, consider the event 
N = { n ∈ [0, 2*) : n is a positive integer modulo 2* }
It is easy to see that if we rotate N counterclockwise by an integer number of radians, the image is a 
strict subset of N. Similarly, we can map N onto a strict superset of itself by rotating the set clockwise.
I  do  not  deny  that  the  view  that  random  spinners  are  necessarily  asymmetric  goes  against  our 
untutored intuitions. Intuitively, there appears to be no reason why a perfectly symmetric random 
spinner should be metaphysically impossible. But isn’t that appearance just mistaken? In fact there is a 
reason:  it  is  Vitali’s  theorem.  Mathematical  facts  constrain  metaphysical  possibility.  Surprising 
mathematical results, like Vitali’s, constrain it in surprising ways. 
All in all, I think the considerations in favour of total chanciness clearly outweigh those in favour of 
the possibility of perfect symmetry in the case of a random spinner. In the infinite coin flips case, the 
balance of reasons seems less decisive in two respects: on the one hand, the abductive argument for 
total chanciness has less of a foothold, because we have no actual experience of infinite procedures; on 
the other hand, the intuitive price we pay here is steeper. 
For it turns out that, in an infinite array of coin flips, total chanciness rules out the possibility that the 
flips are both perfectly fair and perfectly independent. Here perfect fairness means that the chance of 
heads exactly equals the chance of tails for every coin, and perfect independence means that the chances 
of  two propositions are independent whenever the truth of  these propositions supervenes on the 
outcomes of disjoint sets of coin flips. Independence between individual flips, and between finite sets 
of flips, can be maintained even if the coins are fair –– we are not forced to say that the outcome of one 
flip affects the outcome of another. To be sure, it remains a counterintuitive result. But then again, so it 
goes: surprising mathematical results constrain metaphysical possibility in surprising ways.
Moreover, a puzzle due to David Builes (2020) gives independent reason to question the tenability of 
perfect independence in an infinite sequence of fair coin flips.  The contrary intuition is, once more, an 6
extrapolation from the symmetries of finite cases –– a risky step that has failed us time and again. In 
any finite array of coin flips, the flips are fair and independent just in case every permutation of the 
outcome space preserves the chance of an event. But this permutation symmetry fails in the infinite 
 What is the probability that coin flip #1 in an infinite sequence lands heads, given that only finitely many coins 6
land heads? Builes offers good reasons to think it is less than ½. But this violates perfect independence: whether 
or not finitely many flips land heads is fully determined by the way all the other coins land.
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case whether or not we accept Totality. Not every symmetry that can be achieved in a finite array of 
coin flips can be achieved in an infinite array. So on balance, I think there is still a strong case for 
Totality in the infinite coin flip case. Nonetheless, in view of the differences I pointed out, I think it 
would be reasonable to feel more confident in Totality as applied to finite setups like the spinner case. 
For our ultimate purpose here, that nuance matters little, however. After all, we only really need one 
version of the Totality premise.
2.3  Hidden Chance Gaps 
My main argument for the view that random physical  processes are totally chancy has been that 
scientific reasoning about chance is built on that presupposition. This may not be explicit in the chance 
functions scientists and mathematicians employ, which ignore some events to allow for symmetry. But 
it does reveal itself implicitly in our inductive methods, whose justification relies essentially on the 
assumption that every event has a chance –– or so I claim. I now want to consider one strategy for 
resisting this abductive argument for Totality, by maintaining that probabilistic inductive reasoning 
can in fact be grounded on a weaker assumption, compatible with the existence of chance gaps.
Here is the objection I have in mind. It begins by conjecturing that scientists are only ever talking 
about  events  of  a  certain kind –– let’s  say events  that  are  in  some important  sense epistemically 
accessible or observable, meaning roughly that we can reliably tell whether or not the event took place.  7
The next step is to explain the success of probabilistic inductive reasoning in science in terms of the 
chanciness of observable events alone. Consistent with this weaker commitment, the objector is then 
free  to  reject  total  chanciness,  and to  maintain  that  chance-free  events  do  exist  ––  it  is  just  that, 
conveniently, they all happen to be unobservable. In a nutshell: the abductive argument fails to rule 
out the possibility of hidden chance gaps.
Let’s make that a bit more concrete. If we assume that the chance-free events in the spinner case are 
just the non-Lebesgue ones, then the idea that such events are “hidden” in this sort of way has some 
plausibility.  A non‑Lebesgue  event  N  contains  unnatural,  scattered  collections  of  isolated  points, 
which makes it difficult to see how anyone could reliably tell by direct observation whether or not N 
occurred. Suppose, moreover, that non‑Lebesgue events are really entirely unobservable, in that they 
are causally isolated from all observable events. Then it would be impossible to build a Mystery Lamp 
which blinks just in case the spinner lands on an angle in N. For this reason, the objector continues, the 
argument from §2.1 does not apply to unobservable, non‑Lebesgue events like N: our reasoning about 
 The informal use of the adjective observable in this subsection is unrelated to the quantum mechanical notion of 7
an observable. In quantum mechanics, the exact position of a particle, and the exact angle of a spinner pointer 
technically count as observables, even though there is no practical way to ascertain them.
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the Mystery Lamp does not require us to assume events like N have a chance, because it is physically 
impossible for such an event to be causally linked to the blinking of the lamp.
This is a rather elaborate objection, but it is worth addressing: something in the vicinity of this view 
comes naturally to those of us who have learnt to live with the idea of chance gaps. One problem with 
the  objection  is  that  it  is  built  on  some  rather  ambitious  promissory  notes.  The  hypothesis  that 
scientists  only  ever  reason  about  observable  events  stands  in  clear  need  of  clarification  and 
justification. The same is true for the view that there is a substantial class of unobservable events that 
exist in perfect causal isolation from those observable events. Another issue is that it is unclear to what 
extent the objector’s explanation for the success of probabilistic induction really holds its own against 
the simple explanation offered in §2.1. For although this alternative explanation is less committal, it is 
also a good deal more complex, because it invokes the notion of observability. And as a rule, simple 
explanations are better than complex ones.
But  I  will  focus  here  on  a  different  reply,  related  to  this  last  point.  Let’s  spot  this  objector  the 
distinction between observable and unobservable events, and let’s assume non-Lebesgue event are 
unobservable. Let’s also assume that their alternative account of the success of probabilistic inductive 
reasoning can be made to work. I contend that, even if we granted all that, the abductive argument 
against chance gaps maintains its force. For in order to undercut this abductive argument, it is not 
sufficient for the objector to show they are able to consistently maintain that chance gaps exist. After 
all, this argument was never shooting for validity. To resist the argument, the objector has to claim that 
the success of  probabilistic  inductive reasoning gives us no good reason  to  think all  events have a 
chance. But the objector has not shown this. On the contrary, I would contend that the proposition all 
observable  events  have  a  chance,  which  the  objector  endorses,  makes  for  a  great  reason  to  think 
unobservable events have a chance too. After all,  the class of observable events is very large and 
varied.  So  even  if  we  grant  the  objector  their  alternative  explanation,  we  still  have  excellent 
justification for the thesis that both observable and unobservable events have a chance.
The objector’s position is comparable to that of a skeptic who resists the inductive evidence that all 
emeralds are green, insisting that our observations are fully explained on the weaker hypothesis that 
observable emeralds are green (excuse the artificial example). “As for emeralds that are very far away 
or too small to be observed with the naked eye,” this sceptic proclaims, “I frame no hypotheses! For all 
I  know, they could be pink or navy blue or burgundy with yellow polka dots.”  Such a level  of 
inductive  restraint  is  clearly  excessive.  There  is  no  reason  to  think  that  emeralds  should  have  a 
different colour just because they are small or far away. Absent such a reason, we ought to judge it 
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likely that they too are similar to the known sample. We can admit that the conclusion that observable 
emeralds are green is especially secure, and that it is even better supported than the thesis that all 
emeralds  are  green.  But  the  inductive  evidence still  bears  on all  emeralds,  and the more general 
conclusion is justified as well.
I think the same thing is true in the present case. The abductive evidence that observable (Lebesgue) 
events  have  chances  bears  on  unobservable  (non-Lebesgue)  events  too,  because  we  have  no 
sufficiently compelling a priori reason to expect observable and unobservable events to be different in 
this respect.  This is especially true since chance, whatever it  is,  seems to a very basic property of 
events. The contention that there are events that lack this basic property is something that cries out for 
explanation, particularly when accompanied by the rather suspicious qualification that the events in 
question happen to be categorically unobservable and causally isolated.
Admittedly,  there is  a  wrinkle  in the emerald analogy.  While  there was no reason at  all  to  think 
unobservable emeralds should be anything out of the ordinary, the same is arguably not true of non-
Lebesgue events. We may have no direct experience of such events, but as Joel Hamkins (2012, 2015) 
emphasises in his discussion of Freiling, mathematicians do have a lot of distinctively mathematical 
experience with the sets that represent them. Moreover, they have found that non-Lebesgue sets can 
behave in strange ways, overturning our ordinary mathematical expectations. Hamkins claims that 
this is the real source of mathematicians’ resistance to Freiling’s argument: “We are skeptical of any 
intuitive  or  naive  use  of  measure  precisely  because  we  know  so  much  now  about  the  various 
mathematical pitfalls that can arise, about how complicated and badly-behaved functions and sets of 
reals can be in terms of their measure-theoretic properties.” (Hamkins 2012, p. 17)
Hamkins’ main point here is about the unreliability of our pre-theoretical intuitions, which does not 
directly  impugn the present  line of  argument:  unlike Freiling,  I  am building my case on broadly 
abductive, empirical considerations and not on intuitions. But I think that the considerations Hamkins 
adduces are relevant to the abductive argument against chance gaps as well.  Thanks to Solovay’s 
consistency proof, cited above, we can rest assured that none of the odd formal properties to which 
Hamkins alludes logically entail the existence of chance-free events. Still, one might worry that non-
Lebesgue events might somehow lack a chance in virtue of their strange formal properties. The lack of 
homogeneity between observed and unobservable events is reason to be cautious in generalising to 
the class of all events. It is, after all, uncontroversial that inductive generalisations over heterogeneous 
domains are less secure. For instance, an inductive generalisation over the class of all mammals is, all 
things being equal, riskier than a generalisation over the class of all magpies.
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Now I  concede  that  the  known heterogeneity  of  the  class  of  events  weakens  the  strength  of  the 
abductive case for the totality premise (C). But I think it would be a serious overreaction to dismiss the 
argument on those grounds alone. Sure, the fact that some non-Lebesgue events are strange in other 
respects lends some credence to the idea that they may also instantiate the strange property of lacking 
a chance. But that is just to say that the existence of chance-free events would be even more mysterious 
if non-Lebesgue events were perfectly normal and well-behaved in all other respects. It does not erase 
the fact that chance-freeness is another very peculiar property, whose instantiation should puzzle and 
surprise us. Moreover, to reiterate, Solovay’s consistency result tells us that this really would be an 
additional surprise, logically independent of the curious properties ZFC establishes.
It  is  instructive  to  view  the  present  conundrum  in  the  context  of  the  debate  around  the  use  of 
inductive justification in other domains of mathematics, like number theory. As Frege once observed, 
the domain of natural numbers has “none of that uniformity, which in other fields can give [inductive 
reasoning] a high degree of reliability. … Position in the number series is not a matter of indifference 
like position in space … each [number] is formed in its own special way and has its own unique 
peculiarities.” (Frege 1953 [1883], §10)  It is tempting, on these grounds, to endorse a radically sceptical 
view of the use of inductive arguments to justify general conclusions in number theory –– Alan Baker 
(2007) explores this position.
But as Baker is quickly forced to acknowledge, it is difficult to bring that position into harmony with 
the pivotal role that broadly inductive reasoning plays in mathematical practice.  Number theorists 8
make reliable  judgments  about  the plausibility  of  unproven conjectures  all  the  time.  Often,  those 
judgments are informed by simple “experiments” like calculating a few instances. In recent decades, 
these inductive aspects of mathematical inquiry have even become institutionalised with the rise of 
experimental mathematics,  a now flourishing branch of mathematical inquiry with its own institutes, 
journals and conferences (Borwein and Bailey 2004, Baker 2008). 
As  James  Franklin  (1987)  asks,  if  those  experimental,  non-deductive  methods  truly  are  entirely 
unreliable, how are we to account for some maths professors’ ability to reliably identify tractable, 
plausible and unproven conjectures for their PhD students to work on? Timothy Gowers has another 
nice illustration of the point, writing that “Probably all serious mathematicians believe that, in the 
long run, each of the digits 0 to 9 occurs in the decimal expansion of * about 10 per cent of the time,” 
even though “Nobody has found a proof, or even an informal argument, that [* is not biased], and 
 By the end of the paper, Baker has softened his position enough to endorse, in §6, an inductive argument for 8
the truth of Goldbach’s conjecture. Officially, Baker hangs on to his sceptical view about induction in the realm 
of numbers, but only by espousing an unusually narrow conception of inductive reasoning.
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nobody expects to.” Instead, this belief is at least in part based on the fact that the millions of digits of 
* that have been calculated show no bias, and pass various statistical tests for randomness. “Nobody 
has ruled out the possibility that every digit after the 10100th is either a 7 or an 8. And yet it is clearly 
ludicrous to suppose that that might be the case.” (Gowers 2007, p. 34)
In line with Baker 2007, one could criticise Gowers’ statistical argument about the decimal expansion 
of * by complaining that the finite sample on which it is based is dwarfed by the infinite totality of *’s 
decimals. One could also point out that the sample is biased, in that only the initial segment of * was 
considered. But that only shows that in spite of such limitations, an inductive argument can still be 
very strong. It is not to deny they are limitations: if God handed us statistical analyses of an infinite 
sample of decimals of *, with instances taken from evenly spaced stretches along the entire length of 
the decimal expansion, our inductive evidence would be stronger still. But the theoretical possibility 
of  even better  inductive  evidence does  not  imply that  the  evidence we have is  bad.  (For  further 
criticism of Baker’s position, see Waxman 2017, §3.4.1.)
In a real-world experimental situation there are always some properties that divide the unobserved 
instances from the observed ones, and we can almost always improve our case with a larger, more 
varied sample. But the success of experimental reasoning inside and outside of mathematics teaches 
us  that  inductive  generalisations  over  heterogenous  domains  can  still  be  highly  reliable.  So  the 
heterogeneity charge suggested by Hamkins’ remarks does not,  after all, pose a very serious threat to 
the abductive case against chance-free events. I conclude that our empirical evidence supports the 
strong conclusion that  all  events  have a chance,  observable or  not.  Of course the evidence is  not 
entirely conclusive –– inductive evidence never is. All I seek to establish here is that we have good, if 
defeasible, empirical reasons to think the continuum hypothesis is false.
III. Countable Additivity 
That leaves premise (D), the assumption that chances form a countably additive measure. What may 
be challenged here is the view that chances are countably and not just finitely additive. The assumption 
of  countable additivity is  arguably justified by the demand to sustain standard scientific practice. 
Scientists routinely appeal to the theory of Lebesgue integration and to laws of large numbers, which 
rely on countable additivity. Still, many prominent theorists have disputed the countable additivity of 
probabilities, and it would be remiss of me to pass over the controversy in silence (e.g. De Finetti 1990, 
Savage 1972, Arntzenius et al. 2004, Schurz and Leitgeb 2008, Dorr 2010, Zhang ms).
Given the tolerant attitude I have taken to the notion of infinitesimal chances, I should clarify that the 
thesis to be defended in this section is the view that the real parts of the chances are countably additive. 
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Advocates  of  infinitesimal  chances  sometimes  employ  a  more  permissive  sense  of  countable 
additivity, which allows countably many infinitesimals to “add up” to a positive value (for instance 
Benci et al. 2013). Countable additivity in this permissive sense would be insufficient for the main 
argument to go through. So I employ a restrictive use of the term, on which such distributions still 
count as violations of countable additivity.
The skeptics of countable additivity I just mentioned have for the most part been animated primarily 
by arguments that subjective probabilities or credences are countably non-additive. But the countable 
additivity of chance is quite a different matter.  In particular, by far the strongest reason for thinking 9
that rational credences are not countably additive is that, in certain situations, it seems rational to 
divide your credences equally between a denumerable infinity of mutually incompatible possibilities. 
Then your credence in each possibility is 0 or infinitesimal, and yet your credence that one of them is 
true would be 1. To pose an analogous challenge to the countable additivity of chances, one would 
need a random process with denumerably many incompatible outcomes that are all equally likely: a 
de  Finetti  lottery.  But as I  already discussed at  the end of  Section I,  no-one has ever identified a 
plausible real or possible candidate for such a procedure (Norton 2018).
Secondly,  there  is  a  strong conceptual  reason to  think this  is  no  coincidence,  and that  de  Finetti 
lotteries and other countably non-additive chance distributions are in fact impossible. This is related to 
the fact that countably non-additive chance distributions uniquely have the property that there is a 
partition of the outcome space relative to which they make every outcome strictly less likely than some 
other probability function does.  Now that, it seems, is impossible, or at the very least it would be 10
quite odd (as noted by Dubins 1975, Kadane et al. 1996, Easwaran 2013, Pruss  2013). For suppose 
Ch(E)  <  Ch*(E)  for every event E  in some partition of the outcome space.  Then if  you tested the 
hypothesis that the chance distribution is Ch against the hypothesis that it is Ch*, the latter will be 
 The Principal Principle (Lewis 1980) demands that rational agents apportion their credences to the chances. But 9
it does not follow that the countable non-additivity of rational credences implies the countable non-additivity of 
chances.  If  a Principal Principle compliant agent divides their credences between countably additive chance 
hypotheses,  their  credences  about  the  outcomes  are  not  guaranteed  to  be  countably  additive  unless  their 
credences about those hypotheses are countably additive in the first place.
 The general result is the following: 10
Let Pr be a finitely additive probability. Then there is a probability Pr* and a partition { Ei  :  i ∈ I } 
of the event space such that for all i ∈ I, Pr(Ei)  < Pr*(Ei) if and only if Pr is not countably additive.
Proof.  Suppose Pr, Pr* and {  Ei     :    i  ∈  I  }  are as specified. Then Σi  ∈  I  Pr(Ei)  < Σi  ∈  I  Pr*(Ei)  ≤  1.  So Pr is not 
#I‑additive, where #I is the cardinality of the partition. To show #I = ℵ0. If #I were finite, then by finite additivity 
Σ Pr(Ei) = Σ Pr*(Ei) = 1. So #I is infinite. Next, note that δi := Pr*(Ei) – Pr(Ei) > 0 for all i ∈ I. And Σi ∈ I δi is finite 
because Σ δi ≤ Σ Pr*(Ei) ≤ 1. Hence #I cannot be uncountable: uncountably many positive values do not add up 
to a finite value. So #I = ℵ0. Conversely, if Pr is countably non-additive, there is a partition {E1, E2, E3 …} such 
that Σn Pr(En) = 1 – ε with ε > 0. Now let Pr*(En) = Pr(En) + ε/2n, and note that for all n, Pr*(En) > Pr(En). ∎
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confirmed over the former no matter what happens. Test it again, and Ch* is confirmed still more. Why 
would anyone claim that the chance distribution is Ch, if the distribution Ch* is a better fit for any 
observations you could possibly make?
This can be brought out more clearly with a concrete example.  Suppose a friendly and reputable 
shaman tells you that he has a meditative ritual for randomly selecting positive integers, which has a 
countably non-additive chance distribution. In particular, he claims the chance of drawing the number 
1 is ¼; the chance of drawing a 2 is ⅛; and in general the chance of drawing the number n is ½n+1. 
These chances are countably non-additive, because they only add up to ½. As an alternative to the 
shaman’s story, consider this additive chance hypothesis: the chance of drawing a 1 is ½; the chance of 
drawing a  2  is  ¼,  and in  general  the  chance  of  drawing the  number  n is  ½n.  These  chances  are 
countably additive since they add up to 1. The latter chance distribution definitely is possible, because 
it  is  the  chance distribution associated with the  following random method for  picking a  positive 
integer:  toss a fair  coin until  it  lands heads,  and let  the number of tosses it  takes be the number 
selected. Skeptical yet open-minded, you ask the shaman if he would be willing to perform his ritual 
for you a few times, and he agrees. He closes his eyes and begins to hum. Will the shaman’s non-
additive divinations be vindicated, or will the additive chance distribution win out?
No clairvoyance is needed to see what the result will be. The first time the shaman opens his eyes, he 
says “one”. Well, that result is twice as likely given the countably additive chances than it would be on 
the shaman’s chances. The next time, he says “three.” On the additive hypothesis, there is a one in 
eight chance to get that number; with shamanic chances, only one in sixteen. Another clear win for the 
additive chances. And so on. In fact, why even perform the tests? Any outcome is twice as likely with 
the additive chances than with shamanic chances. The shaman’s story loses out a priori, because every 
possible result disconfirms it 2:1. Furthermore, any two results disconfirm it 4:1, any three results 8:1, 
and so on. As I demonstrate in an appendix, every countably non-additive chance hypothesis displays 
this  self-defeating predetermination:  our  credences  in  them are  rationally  constrained to  decrease 
exponentially as we learn the results of more runs of the chancy procedure in question, no matter 
what those results might be.
The point is not just that it is irrational to believe the shaman. Given the close connection between 
chance and inductive reasoning, the fact that we cannot say what results would confirm his story 
indicates that we lack a clear conception of what it would even be for that story to be true. Thus the 
fact that our ordinary reasoning about chances leaves no room for countably non-additive chance 
distributions is a good reason to think such distributions are in fact impossible.
⁂
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Here is a neat way to sum up the main findings of this paper. Our ordinary probabilistic inductive 
practices assume that chance distributions are total, and also that they are countably additive. Once 
we take those assumptions on board, insights in set theory yield all sorts of interesting restrictions on 
the kinds of chancy processes that are in principle possible. Vitali’s result tells us that there can be no 
rotationally symmetric random method for picking out a point on a circle. The Banach-Tarski paradox 
reveals that there can be no spherically symmetric random process for picking out an arbitrary point 
in  a  continuous  sphere.  And Ulam’s  result  shows  that  it  is  not  possible  to  select  one  out  of  ℵ1 
possibilities in a way that gives no outcome a positive chance. Since we know independently that it is 
in fact possible to select an arbitrary point from the continuum in such a way (spinners, random darts, 
infinite sequences of coin tosses), it follows that the continuum cannot be equal to ℵ1.
(I would like to thank Jonathan Hickman for introducing me to Banach and Kuratowski’s theorem; 
this paper has also benefited a great deal from conversations with and comments from Andrew Bacon, 
David  Chalmers,  Nicholas  DiBella,  Cian  Dorr,  Adam  Elga,  Colin  Elliot,  Adam  Lovett,  Jeremy 
Goodman, Zachary Goodsell, Thomas Hofweber, Lorenzo Rossi, Chris Scambler, Trevor Teitel, Dan 
Waxman, Snow Zhang, participants in NYU’s Washington Square Circle and Rutgers’ Foundations of 
Probability Group, and an anonymous reviewer.)
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Appendix A. Banach and Kuratowski (1929) 
This  appendix  exhibits  a  proof  of  the  core  mathematical  result  driving  this  paper,  namely  that 
ZFC + M ⊢  2ℵ0  > ℵ1, where M is the proposed new axiom:
M: Continuum-sized sets " admit of a total, countably additive measure Ch such that 
Ch({x}) = 0 for every x ∈ ".
This proof is a version of the original due to Banach and Kuratowski (1929). Adapted to the present 
context of chance measures, it takes on an especially intuitive form. As mentioned in the text, this 
result was strengthened by Ulam (1930) and again by Solovay (1971) to show that in ZFC + M, the 
continuum has to be much larger than ℵ1. Ulam’s results are covered in Jech 2002 (ch. 10, 131-3).
Definition. Let N+  = { 1, 2, … } be the set of all positive integers. Then if f and g are functions from N+ 
to N+, let us say f is smaller than g, written f < g, just in case f (n) < g(n) for all but finitely many natural 
numbers n ∈ N+. (It is easily checked that < is a strict partial order.)
Recall that, in addition to being the first uncountable cardinal, ℵ1 is also the set of all the countable 
ordinals. Using this fact, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma. If 2ℵ0  = ℵ1, then there is a continuum-sized set " of functions from N+ to N+ such that for 
any function f from N+ to N+, all but countably many members of " are bigger than f.
Proof. The cardinality of the set of all functions from N+ to N+ is 2ℵ0, so if 2ℵ0 = ℵ1, we can 
let { fα : α ∈ ℵ1 } be an enumeration of all those functions by the countable ordinals. Now 
we can construct the desired set " = { gα : α ∈ ℵ1 } using the following recursion:
g 0  : n  ↦  1
gα + 1 : n  ↦  fα (n) + gα (n)
gλ : n  ↦    gβk (n)       where { βk : k ∈ N+ } enumerates the ordinals below λ 
Since these functions have positive values, it follows from the second clause that for all α, 
gα < gα + 1. At limit ordinals λ, use the third clause to see that gβm < gλ for any ordinal 
βm < λ, because for all n > m,  gβm(n)  <   gβk (n)  =  gλ(n). So { gα : α ∈ ℵ1 } is a strictly 
increasing sequence. Now from the second clause we also know that for any function fα, 
fα < gα + 1. Combining these two facts, we can conclude that fα < gβ for all β > α, which is to 
say for all but countably many gβ ∈ ". ∎
Suppose there were a set " of this kind, and suppose we represented each of its members with a point 
on a continuous dartboard at which we are about to throw a random dart. Then that dartboard would 
have the feature that for any function f : N+ → N+ whatsoever, the chance that the function g that is hit 
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